no special knowledge in the estimation domain. Furthermore, participants generally receive input that has either been computer-generated or has been produced by a partner with whom they have no interaction beyond an exchange of estimates. While some studies have begun to address the way expert advice is treated (e.g., Harvey & Fisher, 1997) to our knowledge no study has used participants who are experts in their own right, and thus are likely to make estimates and use peer input in a way that is different from that of dilettantes.
Finally, and perhaps of greatest interest to social psychologists as well as practitioners, features of the process by which estimates are made may both increase participants' willingness to give weight to their partner's judgments and improve accuracy. For example, prior research (Larrick & Soll, 2006) has shown that the manner in which estimates are presented affects participants' sensitivity to the bracketing rate when combining other's judgments. Recent research by Liberman et al. has demonstrated that being compelled to discuss estimates until reaching agreement increases the accuracy of both these joint and subsequent individual estimates made by dyad members.
Overview of Studies
The four studies presented here explore dyadic collaboration in the area of numerical estimation across a range of contexts -varying the types of items, their relevance to the dyad members, and their prior history of collaboration as well as the process by which estimates are made. In particular, we test the impact of the requirement to reach agreement and the manner in which that agreement is achieved, the impact of feedback regarding prior accuracy, and the effects of different types of information exchanges about the bases for own and partner's estimates.
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All four studies address the role of naïve realism in limiting the benefits of collaboration and/or strategies for overcoming this barrier. Studies 1-3 document the effect of extent of initial disagreement on participants' "underweighting" of their partner's estimates. Study 3 provides direct evidence for the role of "naïve realism" among long-term expert collaborators by examining the attributions participants make for the bases of their own estimates versus those of their partners. Study 4 tests a manipulation derived from a naïve realism analysis that we predicted would increase weight given to partner's estimates and reduce estimation error.
Specifically, Study 1 compares the improvement in accuracy resulting from the requirement to reach agreement through discussion, with that resulting from the requirement to reach agreement through a mere exchange of numerical "bids." Study 2 explores the robustness of the underweighting phenomenon and the price it exacts by testing the effect of providing concrete feedback that allows dyad members both to assess each other's prior accuracy and to observe the potential benefits of giving each other's estimates more weight. Study 3 examines attributions made about the bases ("reasonable" and normative vs. "unreasonable" and biased) of own versus other's estimates made by expert partners. Furthermore, Study 3 explores the possibility that a shared bias among long-term collaborators-in this case, the tendency of competitive ballroom dancers to overestimate the quality of their performances-may keep them from reaping the statistical benefits of access to, and discussion of, their estimates. Study 4 tests the effects of having dyad members ask questions about the bases and reasons for each other's initial estimates vs. having them explain and thus justify the bases of their own estimates.
In our studies we use a four-round estimation procedure introduced in Liberman et al. (2010) . This procedure features an initial round of individual estimates, followed by a round of revised estimates made after seeing the estimates of a dyad partner, then a round of agreed-upon Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 7 "joint" estimates, and a final round of individual estimates in which the dyad members are free to give each other's prior estimates as little or as much weight as they wish. This series of estimates allows us to address the incremental value of the requirement to reach agreement for accuracy improvement above and beyond that of simple exposure to a partner's estimates, and the conditions under which this requirement is most beneficial.
Study 1 -The Value of Discussion versus "Bidding" in Reducing Estimation Error
Previous research (Liberman et al., 2010) linked under-weighting of partner judgment to naïve realism and demonstrated that the effects of this bias on estimation accuracy can be overcome if dyad members must agree on joint estimates rather than remain free to give each other's prior estimates as much or as little weight as they wished. Study 1 was designed to extend these findings by manipulating the process by which dyad members reached agreement on joint estimates. While half of the dyads arrived at those joint estimates through a discussion in which partners could explain the bases for their estimates (Discussion condition), the remaining dyads were obliged to arrive at their joint estimates through a mere exchange of "bids" whereby the dyad members simply exchanged estimates until they converged on a single number (Bidding condition). Dyad members were then freed to make a final set of individual estimates wherein they could give as little or as much weight to their own and their partner's estimates as they wished.
This manipulation allowed us to explore the extent to which any improvement in accuracy observed in the third round reflected the role of discussion in allowing dyad members to form impressions about relative accuracy as well as attempts to sway each other's views, rather than reaping the statistical and psychological benefit of having to converge on and commit to a single joint estimate in the absence of discussion.
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Method
Second year Israeli business school students (N = 66), working in dyads, made estimates regarding 9 statistics relevant to business or political decision-making.
1 Item order was counterbalanced. Four rounds of estimates were made-an initial round of independent estimates; a second round of individual estimates made with the knowledge of own and partner's prior estimates; a third round of agreed upon "joint" estimates; and a final round of individual estimates. Associated confidence ratings were made and shared between Rounds 1 and 2 and between Rounds 3 and 4. To encourage accuracy, participants began each round with a bonus of 200 shekels (about $50), and had that sum reduced by 1 shekel for each percentage point error during that round.
The process by which participants arrived at their joint Round 3 estimates was varied between conditions. In the Discussion condition the dyad members were free to exchange any information they wished in arriving at their joint estimates. In the Bidding condition, the dyad members simply exchanged estimates on a worksheet until they reached a single, agreed-upon, estimate.
Results and Discussion
The influence of own and partner's initial estimates on second round estimates
In our analyses of weight given to partner's Round 1 estimates we omitted the 30 cases in which the two dyad members offered identical Round 1 estimates. In the remaining cases, dyad members on average moved only 30.4% 2 of the distance toward their partner's initial estimatea distance far short of the halfway point, t(65) = 9.7, p < .001. Furthermore they gave greater weight to their own rather than their partner's estimates on 72.7% of estimates.
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To test our prediction derived from "naïve realism" regarding the influence of initial disagreement on participants' willingness to give weight to their dyad partner's estimates we created a dichotomous variable distinguishing cases in which a dyad member moved less than halfway toward the partner's prior estimate from cases in which the dyad member moved at least halfway toward that estimate. We then tested a logistic hierarchical model with weighting of partner's estimate as a (dichotomous) dependent variable, and extent of disagreement between the two estimates 3 as the trial-level predictor variable. (No participant-level or dyad-level predictors were included). Our analysis revealed the predicted relationship between size of initial disagreement and the likelihood of giving greater weight to own rather than partner's initial estimate (B = 1.30, z = 2.26, p < .03).
Round-to-round changes in estimation accuracy
Preliminary examination of data revealed that individual estimates varied enormously in their accuracy, and that order-of-magnitude errors were common. To allow us to combine accuracy data across items in which correct answers differed greatly in magnitude, and to better combine cases of large and small underestimation, in this study (and in Study 2), we first transformed both correct answers and dyad members' estimates to base 10 logs. We then treated the absolute difference between the log of the estimate and the log of the correct answer as our measure of estimation error. (Thus, estimation errors for estimates of half or twice the correct answers were both 0.301 and those for estimates one tenth or ten times that answer were 1.0).
As illustrated in Figure 1 , the improvement in accuracy shown by participants from Round 1 to Round 2 (from M = 0.376 to M = 0.325), t(32) = 6.43, p < .001, replicated the results reported by earlier investigators. 4 In fact, the latter mean error was almost as low as the mean However it is important to note that even in the absence of discussion dyad members in the Bidding condition achieved a significant gain in accuracy (B = .016, z = 2.07, p < .04), although this level of accuracy was not significantly different than that achievable through averaging.
In further pursuing the implications of these data for understanding when and why reaching agreement improves estimation accuracy, it is instructive to examine separately cases in which the two dyad members' initial estimates "bracketed" (i.e., fell on opposite sides of) the correct answer, and cases in which they did not. From Round 1 to Round 2-that is, prior to the manipulation-the initial bracketers, for whom averaging guaranteed an increase in mean accuracy, reduced their mean error by 0.12 in both conditions (both p-values < .005). The initial non-bracketers, for whom improvement depended entirely on discriminating better estimates 
Study 2: Effects of Feedback
Study 2 was designed to test the effects of providing participants with salient ongoing accuracy feedback during the estimation task, thus giving them an opportunity to observe both Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 12 their own and their dyad partner's prior level of accuracy, and perhaps more importantly, to observe the potential advantage of averaging. 5 To the extent that under-weighing of partner judgment stems from a lack of information (either about relative accuracy or about the advantage of averaging), rather than being the manifestation of a more invidious bias, as we have hypothesized, salient feedback should help participants make more accurate estimates. Thus the question we sought to answer was the degree to which feedback would lead participants to give more weight to each other's estimates, and/or to give weight to those estimates in a manner that better reflected likely differences in expertise.
Method Participants
A total of 76 participants (38 dyads) furnished estimates in Study 2. All were Israeli business school students who received credit in a statistics course for their efforts.
Procedure
As in Study 1, dyad members made four rounds of estimates regarding 10 statistics of potential relevance to business or political decision-making. In contrast to the procedure employed in Study 1, however, participants offered all four rounds of estimates for each item before proceeding to the next item and in all cases made their Round 3 estimates with the benefit of discussion. Participants in the Feedback condition were provided with the correct answer to each question at the conclusion of the Round 4 estimates for that question; those in the Control condition received no such feedback. Participants worked with the same partner on all ten items and had access to their prior estimates throughout the task.
Results and Discussion
The influence of own and partner's initial estimates on second round estimates
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The results of Study 2 provided clear evidence of the robustness of the "underweighting" phenomenon, in that providing dyad members with the correct answer to each item before moving on to the next one did not prompt them to give more weight to each other's estimates (Table 2 ). After eliminating cases in which dyad members gave identical first round estimates, we found that Feedback condition participants moved a mean of 27.5% of the distance to their partner (vs. 26.6% in the Control condition) and gave greater weight to their own prior estimates in 75.4% of all estimates (vs. 77.5% in the Control condition). To address the possibility that the lessons learned from performance feedback required some experience, we redid these analyses using only the last five of the ten items used in the study. Again, no significant betweencondition differences were found (all t-values < 1.1).
Do these data signify that, despite the accuracy incentives, participants simply failed to attend to the feedback being offered? A closer look suggests that this was not the case.
Participants in the Feedback condition (in contrast to those in the Control condition) did give greater weight to their partner's estimates, but only when their partner's estimates proved to be more accurate than their own on the immediately preceding item (see Figure 2 ).
When we contrasted the responses of dyad members who were more vs. less accurate than their partner on the previous estimation item, hierarchical linear modeling revealed that there was a significant interaction effect between that variable and experimental condition (B = -.143, z = -2.81, p < .01). Specifically, participants in the Feedback condition did give greater weight to their partner's judgments than participants in the Control condition, but only on the item immediately following the one on which their partner had proven to be more accurate. But because the partner who provided the more accurate estimate changed from item to item, no between-condition differences in average movement toward partner's prior estimates resulted Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 14 from such attention to feedback. Furthermore, it is worth noting that even in those cases in the Feedback condition when the partner had provided the more accurate estimate on the preceding item, the average distance yielded by those participants was still only 33.9%, suggesting that a lack of information regarding the other's estimation skills is not the only reason for underweighting of partner's estimates.
To address the influence of disagreement on weight given to partner's estimates, we repeated the analysis used in Study 1. Again, we found that while overall, participants favored their own initial estimate over that of their dyad partner (B = 1.01, z = 4.73, p < .001), this tendency increased as a function of disagreement (B = 1.85, z = 3.30, p = .001), with no significant effect of experimental condition (B = -0.080, z = -0.31, ns). Thus, as predicted, and consistent with a naïve realism analysis, disagreement regarding the initial estimates exacerbated the underweighting bias across both conditions.
Round-to-round changes in estimation accuracy
Provision of feedback led dyad members to give greater weight to their partner's estimate for a given item only when their partner's accuracy on the previous item had exceeded their own. However, relative accuracy of self vs. partner on a given item did not predict relative accuracy on the next item. It therefore should not be surprising that no between-condition differences in accuracy improvement were observed on any of the four estimation rounds. Thus, in addressing round-to-round changes in accuracy, and the effects of initial level of disagreement on such accuracy, we will combine data from the Feedback and Control conditions.
As in Study 1, dyad members' mean estimation errors decreased significantly from Round 1 (M = 0.323) to Round 2 (M = 0.282). This decrease (M = 0.041, SD = 0.045), yielded a Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 15 highly significant t-value, t(37) = 5.56, p < .001, but was more modest than the reduction (0.064) that the dyad partners would have achieved by simply averaging their initial estimates.
When the dyad members were required to discuss their prior estimates with each other and agree upon a single estimate for every item, they decreased their mean estimation error over the ten items to 0.256. This further 0.026 reduction was statistically significant, t(37) = 4.5, p < .001, and slightly greater than the 0.023 reduction they could have achieved through averaging.
Thus, as in Study 1, obliging dyad members to agree upon a joint estimate increased their mean accuracy beyond that resulting from mere exposure to each other's judgments. What role did magnitude of initial disagreement play in producing these changes in accuracy from Round 2 to Round 4? To address this question we tested a hierarchical linear model using accuracy improvement from the second to the fourth round as the dependent variable and disagreement, and also experimental condition, as trial-level predictor variables.
The analysis revealed a significant effect of initial disagreement on accuracy improvement (B =
.06, z = 2.46, p < .02), with no main effects or interaction effects involving experimental condition. Thus, as in Study 1 and in line with predictions based on naïve realism, it was the dyad members whose initial estimates had been furthest apart who proved least inclined to give each other's initial estimates due weight in Round 2. And it was these dyad members who
Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 16 benefitted most from having been required to reach agreement-even after subsequently again becoming free to offer whatever individual estimates they wished.
Study 3: When Long-Term Partners Share a Source of Bias
Study 3 dealt with the effect of shared history of long-term collaboration on the ability of dyad members to benefit from each other's inputs. The benefits of such a shared history would seem to be obvious. Veterans collaborators can develop "transactive memory" (Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985; Wegner, 1987) . They can become able to anticipate what their partners are likely or unlikely to know and can develop mechanisms for effectively sharing and utilizing such knowledge. They may even learn to recognize verbal and non-verbal cues signaling their partner's certainty or doubt, and come to know how much weight those cues should be given.
Longstanding partnerships in particular, also may afford partners a measure of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) giving them greater freedom in asking questions and admitting doubt or error. Finally, as contributors to the group dynamics tradition of an earlier age showed (see Cartwright & Zander, 1968) , to the extent that collaborative experience builds cohesiveness, group members become less focused on individual concerns and more focused on joint goals.
However, highly cohesive partnerships in which the individuals have a history of working together toward shared goals in the face of shared norms and values can sometimes fall prey to a phenomenon akin to "groupthink" (Janis, 1972) . That is, shared motives and perspectives can prevent individuals from expressing, and thus from examining the merits of, dissenting views-especially when the message conveyed by such views is an unwelcome one.
As Surowiecki (2004) explains in The Wisdom of Crowds, in order for the crowd to be "wise" the individual judgments must be independent of each other. To the extent that long-term experience leads partners to rely on similar information and to share sources of bias both in their private Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 17 judgments and in their communications, such history may diminish rather than increase the benefits dyad partners derive from access to each other's judgments.
Participants in this study were competitive ballroom dancers estimating the scores that their video-recorded waltz performance would receive from professional evaluators -an estimation task akin to one they had engaged in countless times as they awaited their competition results, although in this case they would receive scores on a series of suitably labeled absolute scales rather than a simple ranking. Divergences in the two dancers' estimates thus would inevitably pit a more optimistic assessment against a more pessimistic one. To the extent that the dancers' initial estimates deviated from their actual scores in a random fashion, they could be expected to show high rates of bracketing and benefit over the successive estimation rounds from movement toward each other's initial estimates. But, as noted earlier, if they shared a bias-in particular, a tendency to overestimate the scores that their performance would receive-they would improve their accuracy only to the extent that the less realistic partner disproportionately yielded to the more realistic one. The literature on self-assessment (e.g. Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Kruger & Dunning, 1999) and our informal observations led us to expect that the shared bias we have described would preclude round-to-round improvements in accuracy.
Pairs of dancers in this study performed the waltz routine with which they normally begin their competitive program, and immediately thereafter viewed a video recording of the dance.
They then proceeded to make the two individual rounds of estimates, followed by a joint estimation round. To more specifically investigate the phenomenon of "naïve realism" in producing the underweighting of partner's initial estimates and explore the extent to which this bias is present among long-term partners with extensive knowledge of both the subject matter and each other, a questionnaire was introduced between the first and the second estimation Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 18
round. This measure asked participants to indicate how similar they perceived their partner's assessments of their dancing to be to their own, and also to estimate the extent to which various factors-some reflective of knowledge and skill, others of bias and error-had affected those assessments. (Round 4 was omitted to make time for this additional task).
Method Participants
Participants were 18 couples (N = 36) of competitive ballroom dancers who had trained for a mean of 10.1 years. The mean duration of the partnerships at the time of the study was 6.6 years. They received no compensation for their efforts, although the opportunity to receive feedback from the professional judges provided a considerable incentive for their participation.
It should be noted, that although the dancers (in contrast to the participants in the previously reported studies) paid no penalty for estimation error, the ability to accurately assess their performance was emphasized in the instructions as a skill critical to success in competition.
Procedure
The experimenter met with the couples one at a time at a local dance studio. Each couple was video-recorded as they performed their waltz routine (typically 1.5 minutes in duration).
They then watched the video and estimated how a panel of five judges-all retired world-class dancers and experienced adjudicators-would rate their performance on seven relevant dimensions, each of which was defined for the participants (e.g., "Musicality refers to whether the dance was performed in time with the basic rhythm of the music and the extent to which movement expressed the mood and character of the music.") Participants were told that judges would use a 100-point scale for each dimension, anchored at 1-"extremely poor" and 100-"typical of internationally-known professional competitors."
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After viewing the video, the two dancers made individual estimates of the judges' ratings on each dimension and indicated their confidence that their estimate falls within 10 points of the judges' rating. They then exchanged those estimates and confidence ratings with their partners and, after producing a second set of individual estimates (but without viewing the Round 2 estimates made by their partners), completed the questionnaire designed to assess "naïve realism." Finally, the couples engaged in discussion to produce a set of mutually agreed upon estimates for each of the seven dimensions.
Results and Discussion
The influence of own and partner's initial estimates on second round estimates
We omitted from our analyses the 14 cases in which the two dancers made identical initial estimates on a given evaluation dimension. The results of these analyses showed that a history of extensive prior collaboration does not necessarily lead to a dramatic increase in the weight partners gave to each other's estimates. Overall, dyad members moved less than halfway toward their partner's estimate 60.9% of the time, and the mean percentage of distance they moved toward their partner's estimates was 34.0%-a distance again significantly short of the normatively-prescribed 50% figure, t(35) = 3.49, p < .002 (Table 3) .
Interestingly, post-experimental questionnaire responses revealed a negative correlation between amount of yielding and both length of partnership, r(16) = -.47, p < .05, and the individual partner's years of competitive dancing, r(34) = -.36, p < .03. Thus, if anything, extensive experience seems to have strengthened rather than weakened the relevant underweighting bias.
Round-to-round changes in estimation accuracy
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The expert judges showed a high level of agreement in the total scores (averaged across the seven dimensions evaluated) that they assigned to the couples, alpha = .89. When we examined the extent of agreement for the corresponding estimates initially offered by the two dyad members, we found a similarly high correlation, r(16) = .77, p < .001, suggesting that long-term partners, like those assessing their performances, generally agreed with each other about the quality of those performances.
What was most notable about the respective assessments, however, was the large and systematic gap between them -a gap reflecting the dancers' shared illusions or "wishful thinking" about where they stood on the relevant evaluation dimensions. Whereas the mean rating by judges was M = 29.5, the mean rating expected by the two dancers, in their initial individual estimates was M = 50.6. Thus, as we had anticipated, the dyad members collectively shared an optimistic bias in assessing their performances, with the more pessimistic partner's estimate (M = 43.7) tending to show smaller error and to be more "realistic" than that of the more optimistic partner (M = 57.6), t(17) = 3.83, p < .002.
Subsequent analyses of round-to-round changes in accuracy thus primarily constituted an investigation of the willingness of the more optimistic (and almost always less realistic) dancer to yield more to his or her less optimistic (and generally more realistic) partner than vice versa.
These analyses made it clear that no such net increase in accuracy occurred. The mean estimates over the three rounds were 50.6, 50.6, and 51.4, respectively, and the corresponding mean errors were 23.2, 22.7, and 23.2 points.
Clearly, long-term collaborative experience did not train dyad members to accurately and consistently discern more accurate judgments from less accurate ones. In contrast to previous findings, even the requirement to agree on a single estimate produced no round-to-round Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 21 improvement in accuracy. Rather, what the data reveal is a kind of "dyad-think" whereby the partners shared an unwarranted positive bias about the quality of their performances-one that they did not overcome through access to, or even discussion of, each other's inputs.
Level of disagreement, attributions, and yielding
Although the general over-optimism of dyad members somewhat limited the gains in accuracy attainable merely by giving weight to partner's inputs, estimates that were significantly more accurate than those offered in Round 1 or Round 2 could have been reached through a strategy of consistent averaging. Thus, there remains the question of why even these experienced collaborators, like the dyad members in earlier studies, gave so little weight to their partner's estimates. One reason, as suggested earlier, involves the presence, even among long-term, expert collaborators, of "naïve realism"-that is, the tendency to assume that to the extent others fail to share one's own views, those others are in error (Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004) .
To address this prediction, we again tested a logistic hierarchical linear model using willingness to give equal or greater weight to partner's estimates as the dependent variable and level of disagreement as the predictor. As in the prior studies, the model revealed a significant effect of disagreement on participants' willingness to go at least halfway to their partner's estimate of their performance (B = 4.99, z = 3.15, p < 0.003). However, it was the responses to the questionnaire administered to participants following Round 2 (prior to the beginning of discussion) that allowed us to focus more directly on the role of naïve realism.
Following the procedure used by prior investigators (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Liberman et al., 2010; Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004) respondents were asked to rate the extent to which various factors had influenced their own and their partner's assessments. Some of these factors would be regarded as reasonable or normative (e.g., "in-depth knowledge of dancing technique") Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 22 whereas others would be regarded as biases (e.g., "wishful thinking"). We then subtracted the average influence attributed to the biases (on scales anchored at 1-little if at all and 4-very much) from the average influence attributed to the valid reasons and correlated this difference score with the level of disagreement dyad members perceived between their own and their partner's initial assessments about their performance.
The predicted negative relationship proved to be statistically significant, r(34) = -.35, p < .04. Moreover, as apparent in Figure 3 , no such relationship was found with respect to participants' attributions about their own performance assessments. It is also noteworthy that participants judged both their own assessments and the partner's assessments to be most objective and free of bias when they found themselves in closest agreement.
Study 4: The Effect of Exchanging Questions versus Giving Reasons
Our first three studies demonstrated dyad members' unwillingness to give weight to each other's judgments regarding a variety of topics, when given an access to accuracy feedback, and in the face of long-term collaborative experience. Moreover, in line with naïve realism, participants were most inclined to underweight their partner's judgments in cases of high disagreement -precisely those cases in which this strategy is likely to be the mostly costly.
Study 4 was designed to examine a simple procedure for reducing the extent to which naïve realism limits dyad members' ability to benefit from each other's inputs. We predicted that questioning the other participant regarding the reasons and bases for their estimates would increase the weight participants gave to partner's estimates and increase the benefits of the subsequent discussion, because it may prevent dyad members for making negative attributions for each other's judgments. We compared this approach to one of providing reasons for Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 23 participants' own estimates -arguably the more common approach taken by decision-makers, and one allowing for greater information exchange.
Recent research by Chen, Minson & Tomala (2010) demonstrated that asking and receiving "elaboration questions" in the context of contentious debate led to more positive interpersonal inferences and greater receptiveness to the other party's views than did the exchange of counter-arguments. Also, in an earlier study done in the context of work on overconfident judgment and belief perseverance Ross, Lepper, Strack, and Steinmetz (1977) showed that people who explain a potential outcome become more certain about the likelihood of that outcome.
We propose that asking questions regarding the bases of another's estimates, versus explaining the bases of one's own estimates would produce a similar difference in receptiveness.
Asking questions about the reasons behind a peer's estimates, we hypothesize, reduces one's tendency to simply assume that those estimates are based on biased or erroneous considerations.
By contrast, offering reasons for one's own estimate is apt to buttress one's judgment against the impact of the reasons offered for a different judgment by a peer.
Before turning to the specifics of that design, it is important to emphasize that participants asking questions did not receive answers to those questions. As such, unlike the participants in the Feedback condition of Study 2, dyad members in the Questions condition of Study 4 actually ended up with less information based on which they could judge the relative accuracy of own and partner's estimates than those in the Reasons condition.
Method
A total of 122 participants (47 men and 75 women; all members of a paid participant pool at a large East Coast U.S. university) working in dyads, made a series of individual and "joint"
Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 24 numerical estimates following the procedure described in Studies 1 & 2. These estimates pertained to the percentage of those in the same participant pool who, in a recent pre-test survey, reported holding particular political views-for example, a belief that the words "under God"
should be removed from the U.S. Pledge of Allegiance, or a belief that people of the same sex should be allowed to marry. Participants were paid $10 for their efforts and received a starting bonus sum of $30 in each round, which was then reduced by $1 for each percentage point by which their estimates deviated from the correct answer.
After responding to the political belief items, making an initial set of individual estimates regarding peer consensus, and exchanging both sets of responses with their dyad partner, participants in the Questions condition (N = 62) were instructed to "…write down three questions [for the other student] that would help you better understand why they made the estimates that they did." Participants in this condition were further told that the questions could pertain to all of the estimates or to any subset of those estimates. The remaining participants (N = 60) were instructed to "…write down three reasons behind your own estimates that would explain to the other student why you made the estimates that you did." These participants were similarly told that their reasons or explanations could pertain to all, or any subset of, the estimates. After exchanging the written questions or reasons, all dyad members proceeded to make a second round of individual estimates, a third round of agreed upon estimates after discussion, and a final set of individual estimates.
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Results and Discussion
The influence of own and partner's initial estimates on second round estimates
In our analyses we once again omitted the 74 cases in which dyad members offered identical Round 1 estimates. Examination of the remaining estimates revealed a pattern of small but consistent between-condition differences in participants' adjustment strategies. Specifically, participants who had posed questions to their dyad partners at the end of Round 1 tended to give their partner's initial estimates more weight than participants who had given reasons for their own estimates.
We tested a logistic hierarchical model using the dyad members' willingness or unwillingness to move at least halfway toward their partner's estimates as a dichotomous triallevel dependent variable, and experimental condition, question number, and the relevant interaction as trial-level predictors. Our test of this model again revealed evidence of the general tendency for dyad members to move less than halfway toward partner's estimates, B = .915, z = 4.77, p < .001. But it also revealed a significant main effect of condition B = -.536, z = -1.98, p < .05, indicating that, as predicted, dyad members gave more weight to their partner's initial estimates after posing questions to their partners than after furnishing their partners with reasons for their own estimates. Finally, the test provided evidence of a statistically (and theoretically) significant interaction effect between experimental condition and item order. In particular, the effect of the relevant experimental manipulation was stronger for the earlier items (placed sooner after the manipulation) than the later items, B = .079, z = 2.00, p < .05.
Round-to-round changes in estimation accuracy
Examination of round-to-round changes in accuracy revealed an interesting, although somewhat complicated, pattern of results. Dyads in both the Reasons condition and the
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Questions condition significantly improved their mean accuracy from Round 1 to Round 2 (see Figure 4 ), but the two conditions did not differ significantly in the overall magnitude of that improvement. However, when we distinguish cases in which the participants moved less than halfway toward their partner's Round 1 estimates from cases in which they moved halfway or more, and include that variable in a hierarchical linear model, we find a significant effect of condition (B = 3.11, z = 2.77, p < .006) on amount of accuracy improvement from the first to the second round. This analysis also revealed a significant interaction effect (B = -3.10, z = -2.42, p < .02) whereby dyad members who went at least halfway towards their partner's estimates in the Questions condition improved their accuracy, whereas those in the Reasons condition did not.
This interaction suggests that dyad members in the Questions condition were better able to identify and give due weight to the more accurate of the two estimates than those in the Reasons condition. To pursue this reasoning, we distinguished cases in which the participant's own estimate was closer to the correct answer on a particular item from cases in which the partner's estimate was closer, and then tested a logistic model using this dichotomous variable, condition, and the interaction between them as independent variables, and frequency of going at least halfway to partner as the dependant variable (see Figure 5 ).
The test of this model revealed a significant effect of condition (B = -.425, z = -2.09, p < .04), and a significant interaction between condition and whether the participant's own or the partner's estimate was more accurate (B = 0.584, z = 2.41, p < .02). This result indicates that dyads in the Questions condition did indeed make the more judicious weighting decisions.
Interestingly, there was no significant main effect of relative accuracy on frequency of moving halfway to partner's estimate. Thus, overall, willingness vs. unwillingness to give equal weight to partner's estimates did not reflect the relative accuracy of the two estimates.
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Examination of changes in accuracy from Round 2 to Round 3 allows us to tell a simpler story. Overall, participants in the Questions condition showed a further improvement in their mean accuracy following their discussion to reach a joint estimate t(29) = 3.00, p < .006, whereas those in the Reasons condition did not, t(30) = .08, ns. This between-condition difference in improvement from Round 2 to Round 3 proved to be statistically significant, B = 1.203, z = 1.98, p < .05. Given that participants in our earlier studies showed significant improvement from Round 2 to Round 3, the lack of improvement shown by the dyad members in the Reasons condition prompts a potentially important conjecture. Having given reasons-or one might say justifications -for their inputs, the individuals engage in less fruitful subsequent discussion, even when they are obliged to reach an agreement.
Examination of fourth round estimates shows that dyad members in both conditions showed a slight, but not significant, decrease in accuracy in that final round of individual estimates. When we control for initial accuracy, dyad members in the Questions condition ended up making more accurate estimates than those in the Reasons condition, (B = -1.70, z = -2.56, p < .01). Also, while dyad members in the Questions condition showed a significant decrease in mean error from Round 2 to Round 4, t(29) = 2.12, p < .05, those in the Reasons condition did not (t < 1 in the Reasons condition).
General Discussion
Four studies examined the ability of dyad partners to increase their accuracy in making estimates through access to each other's input using a variety of items, informational contexts, and levels of collaborative experience, as well as addressed the role of naïve realism in this process. In all four studies dyad members tended to give their partner's initial assessments less weight than their own, a tendency that on average, has obvious costs in terms of accuracy. In line Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 28 with naïve realism predictions, this tendency proved to be more pronounced when the initial disagreement was relatively large (and thus the probability that the two estimates "bracketed" the correct answer was increased), and the failure to give due weight to partner's estimates, accordingly, was apt to be most costly.
Studies 1, 2 & 4 showed that the requirement to reach agreement on joint estimates with a dyad partner increases accuracy above and beyond the gains achieved through simple exposure to a partner's estimate, and that these benefits largely persist even when the two partners subsequently made a final set of independent estimates. Study 1 clarified this finding by demonstrating that while discussion in reaching agreement produces larger gains in accuracy than the mere exchanging of "bids," even the latter produces gains over individual estimates.
Study 2 demonstrated the limited impact of feedback regarding the accuracy of completed estimates (as well as the potential benefits of more equal weighting) both on the weight that dyad members give to each other's estimates and on the gains in accuracy they achieve over successive rounds of estimates.
Study 3 showed that dyad partners with a long history of collaboration (i.e., competitive ballroom dancers estimating the scores their performance would earn from judges) showed no round to round improvement in accuracy, despite the fact that improvement would have been achievable through averaging. This finding attests to the fact that exposure to the input of a partner with whom one shares a marked bias (in this case, a tendency to overestimate the quality of their performance) produces no improvement in accuracy, even when the partners are required to reach agreement, through discussion, on a set of joint estimates. Study 3 also added to the body of direct evidence of the role of naive realism (Ross & Ward, 1996; Pronin et al., 2004; Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Liberman et al., 2010) by showing that it makes its influence felt even 
Practical and theoretical implications
Our studies attest to the benefit that individuals making quantitative assessments derive from mere exposure to the estimates furnished by a peer-provided that he or she has made an independent assessment and brings different sources of accuracy and bias (in particular, selfserving biases) to the task. More importantly, our studies document the incremental value of having to reach agreement (by deliberative discussion or, to a lesser extent, even the mere exchange of bids) in the face of initial disagreement, especially large disagreements of the sort that generally make people dismissive of each other's views. Moreover, our studies also show that these benefits persist even when the dyad members are free again to give each other's prior inputs as much or as little weight as they wish in a final set of individual estimates.
Our findings regarding the value of discussion over that of mere bidding as well as the conditions under which discussion is not helpful (Study 3 and the Reasons condition of Study 4) prompt questions regarding the discussion process itself. Whereas dyad members in our studies improved the accuracy of their estimates significantly through such discussion (presumably Collaboration, Disagreement and Dyadic Judgment 30 because at least on some items it helped them to give greater weight to the more soundly based estimate), the magnitude of their errors remained notably greater than would have been the case had they consistently picked the better of the two estimates (a benchmark that Soll & Larrick [2009] refer to as "perfect choosing"). Identifying conditions that further increase the effectiveness of discussion as a vehicle for arriving at more optimal weighting of inputs would of course be of considerable theoretical and applied interest.
The studies presented here also serve to focus attention on the relationship between a statistical truism and the benefits vs. costs of diversity in forming small work groups, especially, diversity of the sort that produces sharp disagreement. All things being equal, the frequency of "bracketing" estimates will be highest, and the benefits to be achieved from simple averaging will be greatest, when partners come to their collaboration from different backgrounds or schools of thought, and thus bring to bear different assumptions and models. But to the extent that diversity of bases for assessment are also sources of high disagreement and negative attributions about the other party, mere exposure to the views of the other-especially in the absence of a requirement to converge on a shared estimate through discussion, may prompt the parties to give each other's inputs less weight than would be optimal.
Furthermore, a long history of prior collaboration can be a mixed blessing. In our study of ballroom dancers such history neither prompted individuals to give each other's estimates due weight nor helped them do a better job in recognizing which of their estimates was likely to be more "realistic." But even if these dyad members had given each other's inputs greater weight it would have been to little avail insofar as they shared a predictable tendency to overestimate the quality of their performances, and no tendency for the more optimistic partner to yield more than the less optimistic one.
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The lesson presented by our present findings speaks to the value of environments and specific processes that encourage or even compel compromise between decision-makers who make different estimates about factual matters or about the nature of public beliefs. The finding that dyad members forced to reach agreement on a single estimate showed continuing benefits in terms of accuracy even when subsequently offering their own individual assessments is particularly noteworthy in this regard. Our Study 4 results offer the provocative suggestion that the benefits of dyadic interaction are enhanced when individuals refrain from the standard and seeming logical process of justifying their own views in favor of asking simple questions about the basis of their partner's views.
The present studies, and in particular our findings regarding the attributions made for disagreement, resonate with prior research on the benefits of task conflict and the costs of relationship conflict in organizational units (DeDrew & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999) . While further research is necessary to clearly understand the relationships between these constructs, negative attributions for disagreement of the sort we have documented may be the "missing link" that changes beneficial task conflict into unproductive and damaging relationship conflict. Such attributions may also take us some distance toward explaining the failure of teams to maximize the benefits of diversity documented by many researchers (see Mannix & Neale [2005] for a recent review). But in any case, the recognition that disagreement, especially when it is great, is both a barrier and a resource to effective partnership promises to be a continuing impetus for research. 
